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I. INTRODUCTION
In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,I the United States Supreme
Court recognized 2 an employee's right to union representation during
an investigatory interview conducted by management when the
employee reasonably believes that the interview might result in disci-
plinary action.3 The Court reasoned that a right to union representa-
1. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
2. The Supreme Court enforced the NLRB's decision in J. Weingarten, Inc., 202
N.L.R.B. 446, rev'd, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973), enforced, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
3. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that an employer
restrained employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act when it denied an employee's request to have her union representative
accompany her to an investigatory interview by management where the employee reasonably
feared that discipline might ensue from the interview. Id. Interference with a worker's
exercise of his Section 7 rights is a violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, which provides
that it is an unfair labor practice to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in" Section 7. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch.
372, § 8(a)(1), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)). Section 7 of the NLRA provides: "Employees shall have the right of self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection... NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157.
It bears note at the outset that the Weingarten right to union representation at
investigatory interviews does not create a right to an investigatory interview. Weingarten, 420
U.S. at 258-59. This may be problematic. In NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822
(1984), the United States Supreme, Court made a cryptic reference to the illegality of a
discharge (and therefore, by implication, any disciplinary action), when that discharge has a
chilling effect on concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, commented in a footnote:
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tion at an investigatory interview flowed from Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"), which grants
employees the right to engage in activities for mutual aid or protec-
tion.4 The Court thus viewed the Weingarten right as a collective
right, intended to benefit the entire bargaining unit by preventing an
employer from unjustly penalizing members of the collective. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, explained:
[T]hough the employee alone may have an immediate stake in the
outcome; he seeks "aid or protection" against a perceived threat to
his employment security. The union representative whose partici-
pation he seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the particular
employee's interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining
unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer does
not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment
unjustly.'
The Court's Weingarten decision, however, left three key ques-
[An] employer commits an unfair labor practice if he or she "interfere[s] with,
[or] restrain[s]" concerted activity. It is possible, therefore, for an employer to
commit an unfair labor practice by discharging an employee who is not himself
involved in concerted activity, [or presumably and analogously, who is
discharged for "cause,"] but whose actions are related to other employees'
concerted activities in such a manner as to render his discharge an interference or
restraint on those activities.
Id. at 833 n.10 (emphasis added).
Assuming that by "interference or restraint," Justice Brennan meant a deterrent effect on
the exercise of activities for mutual aid or protection, it is possible that Justice Brennan's
footnote could apply to the Weingarten right in certain instances. If, for example, an employer
were to adopt a blanket policy of foregoing investigatory interviews every time employees
invoked their Weingarten right, and employees perceived a benefit associated with investiga-
tory interviews, those employees might forego their Weingarten right to gain an interview.
Those employees would thus have been "interfered with" and "restrained from" the exercise of
a protected concerted activity, namely seeking a Weingarten representative, in violation of
Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA. What bars the application of footnote 10 in City Disposal in the
Weingarten context, however, is that under Weingarten, there exists no employee right to the
investigatory interview in the first instance. Thus, there is an underlying tension between Jus-
tice Brennan's Weingarten opinion on the one side, and Section 8(a)(l) and Justice Brennan's
comments in City Disposal at footnote 10 on the other.
4. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260.
5. Id. This quoted language, taken alone, can be interpreted to show that the Court
intended to grant labor an entitlement designed to benefit both individual employees and the
collective as a unit. The statutory forums of the Board and the courts, however, have
eschewed this expansive vision. See generally infra notes 45-60 & 62-75 and accompanying
text. But see note 61.
The statutory forums instead have viewed the Weingarten right as intended for the sole
benefit of the collective. Following this collectivist vision, the statutory forums developed
Weingarten to enable members of the collective to engage in activities for mutual aid or
protection. See supra note 3. Because allowing members of the collective to engage in
activities for mutual aid or protection is the remedial purpose of Section 7 of the NLRA, the
notion of the Weingarten right as being remedial in nature is inextricably intertwined with the
concept of the right as being collectively held.
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tions unanswered. First, because the employer in Weingarten had
taken no disciplinary action, the Court's opinion did not determine
the scope of remedies available to an employee whose Weingarten
right is violated during the process of being discharged or otherwise
disciplined. Second, the Court failed to address whether the Wein-
garten right was among those rights that a union could bargain away.6
Finally, because Weingarten involved an employee who was a union
member, the Court left undecided whether the right to representation
would apply to non-union employees.7 In Weingarten's wake, the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") struggled
with these issues as it developed the nature and contours of the statu-
tory Weingarten right,8 thus shaping the manner in which unions and
employers handle daily confrontations between individual employees
and their supervisors. The union's role in such confrontations is espe-
cially significant because a union's ability to intervene on the
employee's behalf might influence the outcome of the confrontation
for the employee.
Industrial arbitrators had long recognized the right to union rep-
resentation at investigatory interviews before the Supreme Court
handed down its Weingarten decision.9 Unlike the statutory forums
of the Board and the courts, arbitrators have tended to perceive the
Weingarten right as one designed to protect individual employees.
This perception is evidenced by the fact that arbitrators have gener-
ally granted individual employees subjected to a Weingarten violation
some type of substantive remedy, whereas the statutory forums of the
Board and the courts do not. 10
This Comment explores the difference in perspective on the
6. The right may be bargained away. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
7. The Board regards the right to representation at investigatory interviews as existing
only for union employees and that a union representative, and not "just any" fellow employee,
is the only allowable representative. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 81 (1988).
For a discussion of the duPont line of cases, see infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
8. Throughout this Comment, the term "Weingarten right" refers both to the statutory
entitlement found to exist under Section 7 of the NLRA and to the right found by arbitrators
either expressly in collective bargaining agreements, or implicitly, flowing from arbitral
notions of fundamental fairness and just cause. See infra note 82. This method of
classification is in accord with arbitral practice.
9. See infra note 41.
10. Maui Pineapple Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 907 (1986) (Tsukiyama, Arb.); Kraft, Inc.,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 360 (1984) (Denson, Arb.). Throughout this Comment, the term
"substantive remedy" refers to a remedy that gives relief to the grieving employee, as opposed
to a "prospective remedy" such as a cease and desist order. Generally, substantive relief
consists of some combination of reinstatement and award of back pay, either with or without
any loss of seniority for time lost during the pendency and resolution of the grievance
arbitration or NLRB unfair labor practice hearing. Also, the record of the alleged work rule
violation may be stricken from the employee's personnel file.
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Weingarten right as between industrial arbitrators and the statutory
forums of the NLRB and the courts. It also considers the conse-
quences for employees when alleged violations of the right are adjudi-
cated as a contract grievance in an arbitration proceeding rather than
before the NLRB as a statutory unfair labor practice. Section II of
this Comment outlines the early arbitral development of the Wein-
garten right. Section III examines the three aforementioned issues left
unresolved by Weingarten, and inquires into whether the statutory
forums of the Board and the courts have resolved these issues by
adopting a conception of Weingarten as a remedial right, intending to
benefit the collective." Section IV identifies factors arbitrators tend
to consider in fashioning a remedy for a Weingarten violation, to dis-
cover whether the arbitral conception of the right substantially resem-
bles the Board's. Finally, in Section V, this Comment concludes that
there is an essential difference between the manner in which arbitra-
tors and the statutory forums of the Board and the courts conceive
the Weingarten right. Specifically, arbitrators view the right as a bar-
gained-for part of the collective agreement between management and
labor, meaningful in and of itself, while the Board perceives the right
as a component of an extensive statutory scheme that exists only to
enable employees to engage in activities for mutual aid or protection.
II. PRE-WEINGAR TEN ARBITRATIONS
Arbitrators recognized the right of employees to have union rep-
resentation at investigatory interviews at least a decade before the
United States Supreme Court decided in Weingarten that union mem-
bers had such a right under Section 7 of the NLRA. 2 This Section
describes the analytical process by which these pre-Weingarten arbi-
trations validated the right of employees to have union representation
at investigatory interviews.
11. Justice Brennan wrote that the Weingarten right to union representation "effectuates
the most fundamental purposes of the [National Labor Relations] Act." Weingarten, 420 U.S.
at 261. Justice Brennan continued:
[T]he Act declares that it is a goal of national labor policy to protect "the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of . . .
mutual aid or protection." To that end the Act is designed to eliminate the
"inequality of bargaining power between employees ... and employers."
Id. at 261-62. Thus, the right does not appear from its statutory underpinnings to have the
protection of an employee's personal rights as a policy purpose.
12. Food Employers Council, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100 (1963) (McNaughton, Arb.);
Acrods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 785 (1962) (Teple, Arb.); Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 769 (1960) (Anderson, Arb.).
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Valley Iron Works '3 is typical of early arbitrations upholding
what later became the Weingarten right. These early arbitrations
tended not to consider the underlying employee misconduct that
necessitated the interview in the first instance, but rather the issues of
whether an employee's insistence on union representation constituted
punishable insubordination, and whether an employer was contractu-
ally bound to allow such representation. The Valley Iron Works arbi-
trator held that the employer had violated the governing collective
bargaining agreement by not allowing an employee to have his union
representative accompany him to an interview with a supervisor. 4
The arbitrator concluded that the collective bargaining agreement
dictated a make-whole remedy,15 without considering the alleged
employee misconduct that, in the employer's opinion, necessitated the
interview in the first instance.' 6 As mentioned previously, in this and
13. 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 769 (1960) (Anderson, Arb.).
14. Id. at 770. In Valley Iron Works, an employee had been directed by his foreman to
clean out a refuse pit. Id. The employee refused to do so and told his foreman that such work
was not within his job description. The foreman then left to check the employee's job
classification and returned to tell the employee for the second time to clean out the pit. The
employee again refused. The foreman then informed the employee that he would have to
advise his superiors of the employee's refusal. Id. During this second conversation, a union
committeeman was present. The committeeman informed the employee that if he should be
called into the next-level supervisor's office he would accompany the employee there. When
the employee arrived at work the following evening, his foreman informed him that the next-
level supervisor wished to see him in his office. The employee insisted that his union
representative, the committeeman, also attend the meeting. The next-level supervisor refused
this request. The employee then declined to participate in the meeting. He was told by the
supervisor to punch out, and he did so. The union then filed a grievance, but no settlement
was reached in the matter for almost one month. Id. During this time, management took the
position that the grievant had quit his job. Several days later, management called the
employee back to his job. The employee returned, and was formally reprimanded for his
insubordinate attitude in refusing to meet with the supervisor. Id.
15. See infra note 21. The "make-whole" remedy is the most extensive remedy available
to arbitrators or the Board. With a make-whole remedy, the employee receives all of the back
pay which has accrued to him while he was precluded from working, is reinstated without any
loss of seniority, and has no reference to the incident appearing in his personnel file.
Alternatively, the arbitrator may grant the subject employee any lesser combination of these
elements of a make-whole remedy.
16. The arbitrator wrote:
In reaching this conclusion the arbitrator in no way wishes to approve of [the
employee's] refusal to carry out his foreman's directive to clean out the refuse pit.
He [throughout his opinion, the arbitrator refers to himself in the third person]
makes no determination as to whether [the employee] was justified in refusing to
comply with his foreman's order on the basis that cleaning the pit was not a part
of his job duties. He further makes no determination as to whether [the
employee] could be disciplined for such refusal. He does observe that arbitrators
have usually held that an employee must comply with a foreman's order, if he
can reasonably do so, and thereafter may file a grievance.
Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 771-72.
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other pre- Weingarten arbitrations, 7 neither the union nor the
employer perceived the alleged underlying employee misconduct to be
a relevant issue. In these early arbitrations, the parties presented the
arbitrator solely with the question of whether clauses in collective bar-
gaining agreements allowing for union representation during griev-
ance procedures were to be interpreted as allowing for representation
at investigatory interviews, or whether such representation was
appropriate only at a later stage in the process.'"
In Valley Iron Works, the employer argued that if union repre-
sentation preceded the commencement of any formal grievance proce-
dure, "the effective management of the plant would be imperiled by
constant conferences in which Union representatives could be
requested to participate."' 9 The employer's argument failed to per-
suade the arbitrator, however, who held that the violation of the
employee's right to union representation at the investigatory interview
made the reprimand and suspension of the employee improper.20 The
arbitrator concluded that, in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment,2' the employee should be made whole.
The terms of the collective bargaining agreement in Valley Iron
17. E.g., Food Employers Council, 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100 (1963) (McNaughton, Arb.);
Acrods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 785 (1962) (Teple, Arb.).
18. In these early arbitrations, management contended that the appropriate time for union
representation was after a formal grievance had been filed by the employee. Food Employers
Council, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100 (1963) (McNaughton, Arb.); Acrods Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 785 (1962) (Teple, Arb.); Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 769 (1960)
(Anderson, Arb.). In reaching the same conclusion as the arbitrators, namely that allowing
representation at subsequent stages in the grievance process may be too late, Justice Brennan
wrote in Weingarten that this assertion by management:
suggests . . . that union representation at this stage [prior to any formal
grievance] is unnecessary because a decision as to employee culpability or
disciplinary action can be corrected after the decision to impose discipline has
become final. In other words, [management] would defer representation until the
filing of a formal grievance challenging the employer's determination of guilt
after the employee has been discharged or otherwise disciplined. At that point,
however, it becomes increasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself,
and the value of representation is correspondingly diminished. The employer
may then be more concerned with justifying his actions than re-examining them.
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 263-64.
19. Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 771.
20. Id. at 772.
21. The collective bargaining agreement read in pertinent part:
ARTICLE IX DISTRIBUTION OF WORK-DISCHARGE
2. No employee will be discharged or suspended without just and sufficient
cause. If, after proper and thorough investigation which is to be conducted as
expeditiously as possible and requested immediately after the discharge or
suspension, it is determined that an employee has been unjustly discharged or
suspended, he shall be reinstated with full pay for all time lost. The investigation
[Vol. 44:467
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Works, however, did not specifically dictate that the denial of union
representation at the investigatory interview made the suspension and
reprimand improper.22 The arbitrator reasonably could have deter-
mined that the employee's alleged misconduct was an aggravating cir-
cumstance and fashioned a lesser remedy. In subsequent arbitrations,
many arbitrators employed such a balancing procedure.2 3 In those
arbitrations, however, the employer presented the employee's under-
lying misconduct to the arbitrator as an issue.
Acrods Co.,24 another early arbitration, reached the same result
as did Valley Iron Works on similar facts. The Acrods employee
refused on two occasions to accompany his supervisor to the supervi-
sor's office for a discussion of his job performance unless the
employee's union representative was present. The employer argued at
arbitration that the employee's refusal to go to his supervisor's office
unless accompanied by his union representative was insubordina-
tion." Arguing that the employee had not disobeyed a work order,
the union contended that he had only asked to exercise a right that
the collective bargaining agreement guaranteed.26 As with Valley
Iron Works, neither the employer nor the union brought the alleged
underlying employee misconduct to the arbitrator as an issue for his
consideration. The arbitrator rejected the employer's contention that
the employee's refusal constituted insubordination, and instead held
that the employee's reasonable fear that the meeting would result in
discipline justified his refusal to attend.27 Both Acrods and Valley
referred to shall be conducted by representatives of the Company and the
International Association of Machinists.
Id. at 771.
22. The collective bargaining agreement read in pertinent part:
ARTICLE XIV GRIEVANCES
1. Should differences arise between the Company and its employees, either
individually or collectively, an earnest effort shall be made to settle any such
differences at the earliest possible time by the use of the following procedure:
(a) The employee or employees together with the Union Steward in the
department where the grievance occurred, shall discuss the matter with the
appropriate departmental foremen and attempt to settle the grievance.
Id.
23. See, e.g., infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
24. 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 784 (1962) (Teple, Arb.).
25. Id. at 787.
26. Id. The collective bargaining agreement defined a grievance as "any difference arising
between management and a Union member." Id. The collective bargaining agreement
provided that employees would have access to their union steward in grievance proceedings.
27. Id. at 788-89. The arbitrator wrote:
In determining the fundamental nature of the order and the propriety of the
employee's refusal, the test is not what the Company may have had in mind [as
to whether to discipline the employee], which could have been known only to the
Company officials themselves, but what appearance was presented to the
1989]
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Iron Works thus framed the Weingarten issue in terms of whether the
employee's insistence upon union representation constituted insubor-
dination, and both arbitrators held that such insistence was not
insubordination.
Food Employers Council, Inc.,28 another pre- Weingarten arbitra-
tion, dealt with the Weingarten issue under the same "insubordina-
tion" paradigm. In Food Employers Council, a supervisor called the
employee into his office to discuss the employee's sub-standard job
performance, as well as to have the employee sign a statement that
indicated he was on notice of possible termination unless the per-
ceived deficiency was corrected. 29 The employee had requested that
the supervisor permit the employee's union steward to attend the
meeting, but the supervisor refused, stating that the employee could
meet with his shop steward afterwards.30 The employee abruptly left
to get his steward, and as a result was subsequently terminated for
insubordination.'
The Food Employers Council arbitrator sought to resolve two
related issues: First, under what circumstances was an employee enti-
tled to bring his shop steward to a conference; and second, was the
employee guilty of insubordination when he left his supervisor's office
where the interview was to have taken place, after the supervisor had
denied him access to his union representative.32 In addressing the
first issue, the arbitrator balanced management's right to direct its
work force against the union's prerogative to represent its bargaining
unit so that the bargaining unit may receive the benefits of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. To strike this balance, the arbitrator con-
cluded that, although it would be unfair to management to grant
employees the right to union representation at "every conference,
regardless of its nature," the collective bargaining agreement nonethe-
less permitted employees to call in their shop stewards when an issue
existed regarding job performance.3 3 The arbitrator's interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement demonstrated a fair amount of
employee concerned and the conclusion which he might reasonably draw
therefrom.
Id. at 789.
28. 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100 (1963) (McNaughton, Arb.).




33. Id. The collective bargaining agreement stated in pertinent part: "The employee shall
first attempt to resolve the issue with his immediate supervisor, or other representative
designated by the employer, requesting the cooperation of the union steward if he so desires."
[Vol. 44:467
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solicitude for the union's position, in that his analysis incorporated a
broad interpretation of the word "discipline," and allowed union rep-
resentation in situations in which a supervisor gives a disciplinary
warning.34
In addressing the issue of insubordination, Food Employers
Council, like Acrods and Valley Iron Works, did not consider the
underlying employee misconduct. Again, the arbitrator did not make
the employee whole to redress a "procedural" violation, 35 but instead
merely addressed the issue of whether the employee's insubordination
constituted a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.36
These early arbitrations37 would comport with the Board's current
conception of the Weingarten right.38 Both arbitrators and the NLRB
would grant a make-whole remedy to the employee on the facts of
these early arbitration proceedings. They would do so, however, for
different reasons: An arbitrator would find that the employer had
taken disciplinary action without just cause,3 9 while the Board would
find an unfair labor practice because an employee had been denied his
statutory right to engage in activities for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection.4
34. The arbitrator accepted the union's contention that "a disciplinary warning is a form
of discipline," as opposed to management's contention that "the action had not been
completed and, therefore, a grievance had not arisen which would have allowed the employee
to insist on his shop steward's participation." Id. at 1101-02.
35. A "procedural" violation occurs where an employer does not allow the employee
union representation and then disciplines the employee not for his insistence upon union
representation, but rather for his underlying misconduct. Such a violation by an employer is
procedural in that the employer inflicts discipline to redress a work rule violation, and not to
punish an employee for his insistence upon the procedural safeguard (the right to
representation) guaranteed in the collective bargaining agreement. That the employer has a
justifiable reason to discipline the employee, which would not be questioned but for the denial
of the procedural safeguard, is what makes the violation procedural.
36. Food Employers Council, 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1103.
37. Later arbitrations tend to go further, and give a remedy to employees who are not
disciplined for their insistence on union representation, but rather for the underlying
misconduct that necessitated the interview. Maui Pineapple Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 907
(1986) (Tsukiyama, Arb.); Kraft, Inc., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 360 (1984) (Denson, Arb.); South
Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 174 (1978) (Wolff, Arb.); Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 67
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 349 (1976) (Clarke, Arb.).
38. The NLRB grants a make-whole remedy only when employers take disciplinary action
to punish employees for requesting union representation. If, however, the discipline is for the
underlying misconduct, the Board will grant no remedy to an employee for a Weingarten
violation. Taracorp Indus., Div. of Taracorp Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984). For a discussion
of Taracorp, see infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Food Employers Council, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100 (1963)
(McNaughton, Arb.); Acrods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 784 (1962) (Teple, Arb.); Valley Iron
Works, 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 769 (1960) (Anderson, Arb.). The just cause concept has a
profound influence on the arbitral process. See, e.g., infra note 82.
40. See supra note 3.
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On another level, however, these pre- Weingarten arbitrators and
the statutory forums of the Board and the courts, in sanctioning the
Weingarten right, were pursuing a similar objective: Both forums
sought to allow unions to represent members of the bargaining unit in
their individual confrontations with management. The motivation for
this action, however, differs between the two forums.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT
In Weingarten, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to
union representation was well established in industrial grievance arbi-
tration.4 ' The Court did not, however, ground the right in arbitral
precedent.42 Instead, the Court grounded the right in Section 7 of the
NLRA and thus deemed the right to be a means to an end-the
means being union representation of employees at employer-con-
ducted investigatory interviews, and the end being employees banding
together for mutual aid or protection.
The Court's decision in Weingarten left open three issues. First,
the Court failed to address whether substantive remedies4 3 for Wein-
garten violations were inappropriate because of the remedial nature of
the NLRA. Second, the Court left unresolved whether a union may
bargain away the Weingarten right. Finally, the Court failed to clar-
ify whether the Weingarten right would apply to non-union employ-
ees. The difference between how the statutory forums and arbitrators
resolved these three issues highlights the essential difference in their
conception of the right. By answering each of the three issues in the
affirmative, the statutory forums have limited the scope of the Wein-
garten right to promoting its limited, remedial purpose under the
NLRA.44
41. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975). The Court cited several
arbitrations recognizing the right including Acrods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 784 (1962)
(Teple, Arb.), and Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 769 (1960) (Anderson, Arb.).
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 268 n.12.
42. Instead, the Court grounded the right in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, which provides in pertinent part that employers may not interfere with, or restrain
employees from, "engag[ing] in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 847
(7th Cir. 1973)).
43. "Substantive remedies" can be defined as a remedy granted to an employee whose
rights were violated, as opposed to a cease and desist order. The issue of substantive remedies
only arose in the context of an employee who was disciplined for his underlying misconduct,
and not for his insistence upon union representation. In situations that involve an employee
disciplined for his insistence upon union representation, the Board's position on remedies
remains to make the employee whole. Taracorp Indus., Div. of Taracorp Inc., 273 N.L.R.B.
221 (1984).
44. See supra note 3.
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A. Remedies
The Board's choice of remedies for Weingarten violations reveals
much about its evolving conception of the right. The Board originally
held that employees were, under certain circumstances,45 entitled to
remedies that included reinstatement and backpay for a Weingarten
violation.46  The awarding of such substantive remedies, however,
indicates not merely a remedial right, but a right significant in itself.47
Recognizing this, the Board, in Taracorp Industries, Division of
Taracorp Inc.,48 substantially narrowed the range of circumstances
under which it would grant such substantive remedies. Conversely,
industrial arbitrators tend to be more free in granting substantive
remedies for Weingarten violations, which is in accord with their con-
ception of the right as significant in itself.
In Taracorp,49 the Board held that substantive remedies for
Weingarten violations are inappropriate when an employer committed
a Weingarten violation, but the employee was disciplined or dis-
charged for cause.5 0 Instead, the extent of the available remedy for
45. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980), overruled, Taracorp Indus., Div. of
Taracorp Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984).
46. See infra note 50.
47. See infra text accompanying note 50.
48. 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984).
49. Id.
50. See infra note 55. The Board's original position was that, under certain circumstances,
the make-whole remedy was applicable in situations in which Weingarten violations occurred,
even if the employee had been disciplined or discharged "for cause." Kraft Foods, Inc., 251
N.L.R.B. 598, 598 (1980), overruled, Taracorp Indus., Div. of Taracorp Inc., 273 N.L.R.B.
221 (1984). In Kraft Foods, the subject employee was discharged for his involvement in a fist
fight following a forklift collision. Id. The Kraft Foods Board held that it would not grant a
make-whole remedy. It applied the following rule: When an employee proves that his
Weingarten right has been violated, and that he was subsequently disciplined for conduct that
was the subject of the interview, the burden of proof will shift to the. employer to rebut "the
prima facie showing of the appropriateness of a make-whole remedy." Id. Hence, the
employer met its burden by showing that its decision to discipline (discharge) the employee
was not based upon information obtained at the violative interview; -and hence, a cease and
desist order was the only available remedy. Id.
The Administrative Law Judge in Kraft Foods wrote that the investigatory taint rendered
unlawful that which may have otherwise been a lawful discharge for cause." Id. at 604. The
term "investigatory taint" is reminiscent of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In
Miranda, the Supreme Court held that "the atmosphere and environment of incommunicado
interrogation as it exists today is inherently intimidating and works to undermine the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege against self-incrimination," and that therefore, before questioning an
arrested suspect, police must inform that suspect of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel. Id. at 445-58, 467-73. The Court held that any such admissions made by a suspect
where the suspect had not been informed of these rights was "tainted" and therefore
inadmissible. Id. at 479.
Interviews that violate Weingarten are not conceptually analogous to Miranda violations.
The constitutional protection against self-incrimination is an entitlement that belongs to each
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the violation should be a cease and desist order, issued by the Board,
and posted by the employer. The Board in Taracorp, reasoned that to
grant a substantive remedy for employees who were disciplined or dis-
charged for cause would be to grant them a windfall because they
were disciplined not for their insistence on the statutory right to rep-
resentation, but for their underlying misconduct that necessitated the
interview in the first instance.5 The Board also noted that granting a
substantive remedy would tend to create situations that encouraged
"the transformation of investigatory interviews into formalized adver-
sary proceedings,"" something the Supreme Court had indicated in
Weingarten was undesirable.53
In addition, the Board in Taracorp concluded that to allow a
make-whole remedy would deviate from the remedial nature of the
NLRA.54 The Board, in justifying this determination, cited the reme-
dial restriction in Section 10(c) of the NLRA, which provides that:
"No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individ-
ual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the
payment to him of any backpay, if such individual was suspended or
discharged for cause."5 5 Thus, the Board viewed the Weingarten
individual citizen. Miranda rights are designed to safeguard each individual citizen against
oppressive governmental power. As such, Miranda rights exist for their own sake. Because
the Weingarten right exists only as part of a distinct statutory scheme to facilitate organized
labor, the concept of "taint" in the Miranda sense misses the mark. Keeping this in mind, it is
not surprising that the Board overruled Kraft Foods in Taracorp.
51. Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. at 223.
52. Id. (footnote omitted).
53. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261 (1975).
54. In this regard, the Board noted that it:
possesses a certain latitude in fashioning remedies for unfair labor practices. Our
discretion, however, is not absolute. Thus, we are bound by certain specific and
general restrictions that limit our remedial authority. This is particularly true
regarding our authority to impose a remedy of reinstatement and backpay. The
clearest example of when a make-whole remedy of reinstatement and backpay is
appropriate is where an employee is discharged or disciplined for engaging in
union or other protected concerted activities.
Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. at 222.
55. The Board went on to distinguish between "cause" as Section 10(c) contemplates, and
"just cause" as arbitrators use the term. Chairman Dotson wrote:
It is important to distinguish between the term "cause" as it appears in Sec. 10(c)
and the term "just cause," which is a term of art traditionally applied by
arbitrators in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements. Just cause
encompasses principles such as the law of the shop, fundamental fairness, and
related arbitral doctrines. Cause, in the context of Sec. 10(c), effectively means
the absence of a prohibited reason. For under our Act: "Management can
discharge for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all. It has, as the master of
its own business affairs, complete freedom but with one specific, definite
qualification: it may not discharge when the real motivating purpose is to do that
which [the Act] forbids."
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right as merely a means of facilitating employees banding together for
mutual aid or protection, and not as an individual entitlement.
B. Waiveability
Because the NLRB, in enforcing the National Labor Relations
Act, seeks primarily to create an environment in which employees
may band together and select a bargaining representative that will
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment, 56 it follows that a
collective bargaining representative should be able to bargain away
the Weingarten right during the course of contract negotiations with
management. This is because once employees have been able to band
together for mutual aid or protection, and have reached the collective
bargaining stage, the purpose served by the Weingarten right has been
fulfilled." To enforce the right in situations in which it had been
waived, therefore, would be beyond the scope of the Act, unless the
Board determined that when the right had been waived, employees
could no longer band together for mutual aid or protection. The
Board, however, has made no such determination.
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. NLRB,5 s the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a collective
bargaining representative could bargain away the Weingarten right."
The Fifth Circuit stated:
Since the right to representation only inheres upon the employee's
request, it is clear that the employee's silence can be an effective
waiver of the right. Since the individual can waive his Weingarten
right and the Supreme Court has recognized the right of a contrac-
tual waiver for other such fundamental rights, it would appear that
a contractual waiver of the Weingarten right is possible."
The Fifth Circuit recognized that although certain "individual
Id. at 222 n.8 (quoting NLRB v. Columbus Marble Works, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956)).
Notwithstanding the import of the above-quoted language, when an employer inflicts dis-
cipline putatively in response to an employee's underlying misconduct, and a Weingarten vio-
lation takes place, if the employer disciplines the employee on the basis of information elicited
during the course of the violative interview, one could argue that the cause-in-fact for the
discipline was the Weingarten violation. But cf supra note 50 (concept of "taint" in the
Miranda sense is not applicable to Weingarten situations because of the collectively held nature
of the Weingarten right). The "real motivating purpose," to borrow the phrase from Colum-
bus Marble Works, supra, for discipline in such a scenario, however, is not retaliation for the
employee's insistence on the Weingarten right, but rather for the underlying misconduct.
Under the "real motivating purpose" formula, there would be no unfair labor practice.
56. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 419 (4th ed. 1985).
57. See supra note 3.
58. 661 F.2d. 398 (5th Cir. 1981).
59. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
60. Prudential, 661 F.2d at 400.
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statutory rights"'" were waiveable,62 waiver would not be allowed
"when the waived right affect[ed] the employee's right to exercise his
basic choice of bargaining representative. ' 63  The only rights that
cannot be forfeited, then, without negating the statutory purpose of
Section 7, are those rights that focus directly on employee selection of
a collective bargaining representative. 64 Because these rights are of
such independent significance under the Act, they are deemed indis-
pensable. However, the Weingarten right is not an independently sig-
nificant, indispensable right, and thus may be traded away by unions.
C. The Union as Providing the Sole Allowable Weingarten
Representative
In E.. duPont de Nemours & Co., 65 the NLRB held that the
right to representation at investigatory interviews applies only to
union employees.66 The Board based its decision on the rationale that
Weingarten's purpose of fostering an environment in which employees
may band together for mutual aid or protection was not necessarily
served by allowing Weingarten rights to apply in non-union situa-
tions. The Board concluded that although Section 7 could be inter-
preted as giving the Weingarten right to non-union employees, the
interests of both labor and management are better served by not
extending the right.67
The duPont Board advanced three arguments to support its deci-
sion. First, the Board observed that union representatives seek to dis-
61. Id. In Prudential, the Board held that a union had not in fact waived the employee's
Weingarten right. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 251 N.L.R.B. 1591, 1592 (1980). The Fifth
Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's decision, holding that the union had waived the
right. Prudential, 661 F.2d at 401.
The Fifth Circuit termed the Weingarten right an "individual" right. Id. at 400. It based
its classification on the fact that an employee may waive his Weingarten right simply by not
invoking it. Id. In this sense, the Weingarten right may be called an individual right.
Weingarten's true focus, however, is not on the individual, but rather the collective. See supra
note 11.
62. The Fifth Circuit in Prudential cited Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1953) (union waiver of employees' right to strike), for the proposition that "individual"
statutory rights may be waived by the collective bargaining representative. Prudential, 661
F.2d at 400-01.
63. Id. at 401.
64. See supra note 3.
65. 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,477A, at 33,718 (June 30,
1988); see Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 819-20 n.111 (1989) (criticizing the
duPont decision).
66. In so holding, the duPont Board followed Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230
(1985), rev'd on other grounds, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
67. duPont, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,477A, at 33,718
(June 30, 1988).
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cover and remedy employer unfair labor practices, which may also
constitute behavior in contravention of the collective bargaining
agreement. 68 Thus, the Board concluded, union representatives tend
to look after the interests of the entire bargaining unit.6 9 Individual
employees, on the other hand, simply wish to avoid any negative con-
sequences that may result from the investigatory interviews, and usu-
ally are unconcerned with the overall welfare of the bargaining unit.7"
The Weingarten right, with its basis in Section 7 of the NLRA, does
not have as its primary focus the individual employee who might be
the subject of the interview. Allowing "regular" employees to act as
Weingarten representatives thus would not further the statutory pur-
pose of Section 7.71
Second, the Board noted that the Supreme Court in Weingarten
had expressed its expectation that by allowing employees to insist on
the presence of their union representative at investigatory interviews,
resort to formal grievance procedures could be avoided. 72 The union
representative, the Court had surmised, could assist the parties in
"getting to the bottom" of the situation at the interview itself.73 The
Board interpreted the Court's expectation as a fundamental aspect of
Weingarten's purpose and reasoned that non-union employees are
unlikely to serve the purpose of issue clarification and resolution as
Weingarten representatives. 74 Finally, the Board reasoned that non-





73. Id. For a counterargument to this line of reasoning, see Taracorp Industries, Division
of Taracorp Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984).
74. duPont, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 1987-1988 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,477A, at 33,720
(June 30, 1988). The duPont Board wrote:
The (Weingarten] Court also saw the presence of a union representative as
serving the interest of the employer as well. Thus, it observed that a
"knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by eliciting
favorable facts" that an inarticulate employee might to [sic] be too fearful or
otherwise unable to mention, thereby "sav[ing] the employer production time by
getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview." In this regard,
the Court [in Weingarten] viewed the "presence of the union steward ... as a
factor conducive to the avoidance of formal grievances through the medium of
discussion and persuasion conducted at the threshold of an impending grievance
Examining the foregoing considerations in a nonunion setting, we conclude
that many of the useful objectives listed by the Court either are much less likely
to be achieved or are irrelevant. Thus, in a nonunion setting there is no
guarantee that the interests of the employees as a group would be safeguarded by
the presence of a fellow employee at an investigatory interview. Unlike a union
steward (or his or her proxy), a fellow employee in a nonunionized work force
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union employees would not possess the expertise necessary to vindi-
cate the collective right. The Board apparently presumed that such
expertise is possessed exclusively by union stewards who are trained
to represent employees at investigatory interviews. 75 In concluding
that Weingarten applies exclusively to union employees, the Board
remained faithful to its conception of Weingarten as an instrument for
protecting labor's right to band together for mutual aid or protection,
rather than as an entitlement meaningful in itself.
IV. ARBITRAL TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO UNION
REPRESENTATION AT INVESTIGATORY INTERVIEWS
SINCE WEINGARTEN
Unlike the pre- Weingarten arbitrations,16 those occurring after
Weingarten have addressed the issue of whether an employer's denial
of the Weingarten right would serve to mitigate or eliminate prejudice
against an employee for his alleged underlying misconduct. 77 These
arbitrators have in many instances considered the employer's viola-
tion as a mitigating factor for the employee.
As noted previously, arbitrators often grant substantive remedies
to employees whose Weingarten right has been violated,78 whereas the
NLRB does not.79 This difference in remedy reflects the distinction
between the manner in which arbitrators and the Board view the
nature and purpose of the Weingarten right. The Board views the
has no obligation to represent the interests of the entire bargaining unit.
Furthermore, an employee in a nonunion work force would be much less able
than a union representative to "exercis[e] vigilance to make certain that the
employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment
unjustly," as it is unlikely that such an employee would have the benefit of a
framework similar to that typically established in a collective-bargaining
agreement in which acts amounting to misconduct and means of dealing with
them are defined. Nor would an employee in a nonunion setting be likely to have
access to information as to how other employees had been dealt with in similar
circumstances; whereas a union representative would typically be entitled to
information from which it could be determined whether the employer was
maintaining consistency and fairness in discipline.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
75. See supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., Food Employers Council, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100 (1963)
(McNaughton, Arb.); Acrods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 784 (1962) (Teple, Arb.); Valley Iron
Works, 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 769 (1960) (Anderson, Arb.).
77. See, e.g., Maui Pineapple Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 907 (1986) (Tsukiyama, Arb.);
Kraft, Inc., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 360 (1984) (Denson, Arb.); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 71 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 174 (1978) (Wolff, Arb.); Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 349
(1976) (Clarke, Arb.).
78. See supra notes 76-77. For a definition of "substantive remedies," see supra note 10.
79. Taracorp Indus., Div. of Taracorp Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984).
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right as remedial in nature.80 To the Board, the Weingarten right is
merely an instrument to allow employees to engage in activities for
mutual aid or protection." Arbitrators, on the other hand, view the
right as one that is bargained for. Arbitrators find the right to exist
either as a direct provision of a collective bargaining agreement, or as
an implied provision via arbitral notions of fundamental fairness and
just cause.8 2 In either instance, to the arbitrator, the right exists for
its own sake, and hence requires a substantive remedy. Given that
arbitrators are generally willing to provide a substantive remedy to an
employee whose Weingarten right has been violated, there remains
the issue of how arbitrators determine the extent of the appropriate
remedy.
In Maui Pineapple Co.,83 the arbitrator faced a dilemma when
attempting to determine an appropriate remedy for a Weingarten vio-
lation. One commentator has described the dilemma:
When the employer has not observed contractually mandated pro-
cedural requirements, or is found to have otherwise engaged in
procedural irregularities inconsistent with a "just cause" standard,
arbitrators are faced with the problem of formulating a remedy....
... [W]hen there has been a procedural violation in a dis-
charge or discipline case, there are three possible positions that
arbitrators may adopt: (1) that unless there is strict compliance
with the procedural requirements, the entire action at issue will be
nullified ["fatal error"]; (2) that the requirements are of signifi-
cance only where the employee can demonstrate that he has been
prejudiced by failure to comply therewith; or (3) that the require-
ments are important, and that any failure to comply will be penal-
ized, but that the action taken is not necessarily rendered null and
80. See supra note 3.
81. The statutory end that Weingarten pursues is enunciated in Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); see supra note 3.
82. Consider the comments of the arbitrator in Maui Pineapple Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
907 (1986) (Tsukiyama, Arb.): "Even where the right of union represetation is not explicitly
provided in the agreement, the trend of arbitral authority regards the 'Weingarten right' as an
implied requirement of procedural 'just cause' in management's disciplinary process." Id. at
910.
83. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 907 (1986) (Tsukiyama, Arb.). The arbitrator in Maui Pineapple
articulated this dilemma. He wrote: "An arbitral dilemma is created when an employee is
found guilty of gross dischargeable misconduct but management's action disciplining for such
offense is found to be deficient, flawed or in violation of contractual procedure." Id. at 911.
In Maui Pineapple, the grieving employee was terminated for sleeping on the job after
having been cited by the employer with a final warning against such behavior. This employee
behavior constituted the "gross dischargeable misconduct" of which the arbitrator wrote. Id.
at 911-12. The arbitrator found, however, that the employer had denied the employee access
to his union representative at the investigatory interview that took place after the employee's
foreman found the employee sleeping. This denial constituted the "flawed procedure" to
which the arbitrator alluded. Id. at 912.
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void.84
Reviewing these alternatives, the Maui Pineapple arbitrator
reasoned:
Where the procedural violation is egregious or flagrant, the appro-
priate remedy might be to nullify the discharge action entirely.
But where, in balance, the dischargeable misconduct is serious and
heavy, established by clear, convincing proof, and free of arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory management conduct, a proper rem-
edy may call for the application of the second and/or third posi-
tion or option above-discussed.8"
Following this calculus, the arbitrator balanced two factors: The
fact that the employer had used some statements made during the
course of the violative interview against the fact that the arbitrator did
not believe that union representation would have impacted the out-
come.86 The arbitrator concluded that, although the discharge had
been for cause, the employer's denial of the employee's procedural
right under the collective bargaining agreement merited punish-
ment.87 Accordingly, the arbitrator allowed the discharge, but
awarded the grievant back pay.8
A. Fatal Error
A minority of arbitrators follow the first alternative of nullifying
an employer's disciplinary action when the employer has committed a
Weingarten violation. Arbitrators who believe that redress of a Wein-
garten violation calls for the nullification of all disciplinary action pre-
sumably also believe that the due process and just cause concerns of
labor cannot be met while the disciplinary action is allowed to
stand. 9 If those arbitrators believed otherwise, they would instead
84. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 91 (1981), quoted in Maui
Pineapple, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 911-12. Alternatives (2) and (3) represent the "balancing
approach." See infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
85. Maui Pineapple, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 912.
86. Id. Thus, it appears that the central concern for the Maui Pineapple arbitrator was
whether the grievant had been prejudiced by the violation.
87. The arbitrator quoted Hill & Sinicropi:
The third approach recognizes that procedural requirements are important and
that any failure to comply will be penalized, but will not thereby render the
action void .... In order to encourage future compliance, one remedy is not to
reinstate the grievant, but rather to order the employer to pay the grievant back
pay from the date of the violation to the date of the award because it failed to
follow the procedural requirements of the contract.
Id. (quoting M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 84, at 95).
88. Id.
89. Under the "fatal error" paradigm, the remedy for a Weingarten violation is to make
the employee whole. For a discussion of the make-whole remedy, see supra note 15.
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balance the underlying employee misconduct against the employer's
procedural breach, as part of their effort to reconcile the opposing
interests of management and labor.
The arbitrator in Combustion Engineering, Inc.9° adopted the
"fatal error" method of remedy selection.9 In Combustion Engineer-
ing, the collective bargaining agreement contained a provision that
required that the agreement be construed so as to comply in all
respects with the laws of the United States.92 The arbitrator found no
language in the collective bargaining agreement that addressed the
Weingarten issue.91 The arbitrator determined that Weingarten
required that the employee be made whole regardless of his alleged
misconduct.
94
B. The Balancing Approach
The majority of arbitrators have not read Weingarten as broadly
as did the Combustion Engineering arbitrator. Rather, most arbitra-
tors have tried to balance concepts of "just cause," "fundamental fair-
ness," and "industrial due process" with management's prerogative to
direct its workforce. Kraft, Inc."9 is an example of such an effort to
reconcile the conflicting interests of the opposing parties. The Kraft
arbitrator found that a violation of the employees' right to union rep-
resentation during investigatory interviews, which was provided for in
the collective bargaining agreement, was to an extent offset by the
employees' refusal to submit to a body search for marijuana when the
employer reasonably suspected that there had been a violation of its
drug rule.96
The Kraft arbitrator apparently was aware of managerial con-
90. 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 349 (1976) (Clarke, Arb.).
91. In Combustion Engineering, the employee's foreman noticed that the employee was not
at his work station. Id. at 350. The foreman searched for the employee and eventually found
him in a restroom. After some discussion between the two men, the foreman ordered the
employee to accompany him to his supervisor's office. The employee demanded that his union
steward be present at this discussion. His request was denied by the foreman. During the
meeting between the employee, his supervisor, and his foreman, the employee was suspended
pending further disciplinary action. Id.
92. The collective bargaining agreement read in pertinent part: "Any part of this
Agreement which is or may become in violation of or in conflict with the laws of the United
States ... shall be null and void, and shall be made to conform to such laws without voiding
any other part of this Agreement." Id. at 349-50.
93. The arbitrator, at least, cited no such language in his opinion.
94. Combustion Eng'g, 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 352.
95. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 360 (1984) (Denson, Arb.). This arbitration should not be
confused with the NLRB Kraft Foods case, see supra note 50, that deals with remedies in the
statutory context.
96. Kraft, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 365.
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cerns. He wrote that "[s]upervisory orders are to be promptly com-
plied with and not after a period of debate and deliberation by the
employees."' 97 The arbitrator's chosen remedy, however, indicated
that arbitral notions of just cause and fundamental fairness also influ-
enced his decision."a The Kraft arbitrator, unlike others, was not
especially concerned with whether the procedural violation had in
fact prejudiced the employee. 99
In South Central Bell Telephone Co., 'I the arbitrator expressed
greater concern for whether a Weingarten violation had prejudiced
the employee. The South Central Bell arbitrator considered the mer-
its of the case, and placed relatively little weight on the procedural
breach by the employer when he fashioned a remedy. The arbitrator
found the denial of union representation to be a breach of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, but did not consider the breach to affect
the merits of the case.'' The arbitrator emphasized instead that the
employer, in conducting the violative interviews, could have elicited
information damaging to the subject employee, 0 2 but in fact no
employee made any incriminating statements during the course of the
violative interviews. The arbitrator stated that had any of the
employees made incriminating statements during the violative inter-
views, those statements "would be regarded with skepticism and given
97. Id.
98. The Kraft arbitrator concluded: "Equity requires that the Company not be permitted
to fully enforce its contractual right to discharge employees without first fully complying with
the contractual due process requirements regarding representation. Based on these
considerations, the appropriate penalty is a suspension without pay, rather than discharge."
Id. at 366.
99. The Kraft arbitrator believed: "Whether earlier representation of the grievants would
have changed the outcome of this matter is not important." Id.
100. 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 174 (1978) (Wolff, Arb.). In South Central Bell, several phone
operators walked off the job after the office air-conditioning had been inoperative for two days.
Id. at 175. The following day, when the employees returned to work, the company supervisor
met with each of them. Id. Among other things, the supervisor inquired as to the reason for
leaving, whether there was a concerted movement to leave, and in at least one instance, the
supervisor made notes from which a statement was prepared for signature by the employee
being questioned. Id. at 176. During the meetings, several of the employees asked to have
their union representative present, but the supervisor refused their requests. Id.
101. Id. at 177.
102. Dealing with the issue of prejudice, the arbitrator wrote: "Had the employee during
the interview made incriminating statements, or statements that were used in a subsequent
arbitration proceeding, those statements would 'be regarded with skepticism and given weight
only when other evidence corroborates their substance.' " Id. By coming to this conclusion,
the arbitrator construed the right so as to give it practical value to employees (they cannot be
disciplined or discharged based solely on incriminating statements made during violative
interviews) while not interfering with management's prerogative to discharge or discipline for
cause, so long as the "cause" is not provided at the violative interview.
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weight only when other evidence corroborates their substance." ' 3
Although the arbitrator determined that none of the employees made
any incriminating statements during the violative interviews,1 4 he
warned that had any been made, "if the discipline was grounded in
such statements, the discipline might well be set aside."10 The South
Central Bell arbitrator thus was primarily concerned with whether
the Weingarten violation had prejudiced the employee.
Kraft and South Central Bell are both variations on the balancing
theme. These two opinions generally demonstrate what arbitrators
often do when faced with the task of balancing a management viola-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement against a work rule viola-
tion by an employee. In such situations, arbitrators tend to weigh
three factors in fashioning a remedy: the extent of the employer's
denial of union representation, the severity of the employee's work
rule violation, and the prejudice to the employee resulting from the
employer's denial of union representation. This balancing approach
seems to be the sole manner in which arbitrators can accomplish three
competing objectives: preserving management's authority to direct its
workforce, allowing the union to represent its members and enforce
the collective bargaining agreement, and dispensing justice to both
parties to the arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
Industrial arbitrators and the statutory forums of the Board and
the courts recognize the Weingarten right to union representation at
investigatory or disciplinary interviews conducted by management. 106
The right takes on a substantially different character, however, when
applied in one forum as opposed to the other. The NLRB conceives
of the right as a component part of the guarantee of Section 7 of the
NLRA that workers may band together for mutual aid or protection.
Arbitrators perceive the right as one for which the union has bar-
gained. As a practical matter, violations of a bargained-for right
require harsher sanctions than do violations of a remedial right. This
is so because when a remedial right has been violated, a prospective
remedy will suffice, as the right does not exist for its own sake. The
Board, as enforcer of a remedial right, is thus seeking to redress the
103. Id. (citing Thrifty Drug Stores, 50 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1253, 1262 (1968) (Jones, Arb.)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Maui Pineapple Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 907 (1986) (Tsukiyama, Arb.); Kraft, Inc.,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 360 (1984) (Denson, Arb.); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 71 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 174 (1978) (Wolff, Arb.); Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 349 (1976)
(Clarke, Arb.); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
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cause of the violation, rather than its consequences to the individual
employee. Managerial interference with the right of employees to
band together for mutual aid or protection is the evil the statutory
right seeks to eradicate. A bargained-for right, however, may be pre-
sumed to exist for its own sake.10 7 It therefore requires redress for
each individual violation.
Beyond the bargained-for nature of the Weingarten right as it
exists in the arbitral context, notions of fundamental fairness and just
cause tend to influence arbitrators toward granting a substantive rem-
edy to employees whose Weingarten right has been violated. Thus,
although the Weingarten right appears facially identical in either
forum, the essential difference in the way the forums conceive of the
right has produced significant practical manifestations.
STEVEN J. SILVERMAN
107. In the arbitral context, the Weingarten right may be presumed to exist for its own sake
because it was retained by labor, when instead labor could have traded the right for some other
entitlement. For a discussion of the Weingarten right in light of the Coase Theorem, see
Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 280-82
(1987).
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